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INTRODUCTION
For over two decades, published case law from state courts
across the country have been addressing the issue of whether a
pharmacist has a duty to warn patients about the potential dan-
gers and adverse effects associated with prescription drugs.1 Even
after decades of appellate court decisions, the issue of a pharma-
* Kimberly A. Burns is a pharmacist and an attorney. Currently, an Associate Pro-
fessor at the LECOM School of Pharmacy in Erie, PA and Of Counsel with the Carpenter
Law Firm, PLLC.
** Alan R. Spies is a pharmacist and an attorney. Currently, an Assistant Professor
at Southwestern Oklahoma State University in Weatherford, OK.
1. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHAIN DRUG STORES, Pharmacists' Duty to Warn,
Lawsuits Claiming That Pharmacists Must Warn Customers About Dangers Associated
With Prescription Drugs, http://www.nacds.org/user-assets/pdfs/gov-affairs/dutytowarn.pdf
(last visited April 4, 2008) [hereinafter NACDS Duty to Warn].
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cist's duty to warn is still unsettled.2 As the evolution of a phar-
macist's duty to warn continues to provide legal inconsistencies
among various state courts, there continues to be no clear guid-
ance for the pharmacy profession as to exactly what legal respon-
sibilities a pharmacist has in warning patients.
3
In addition to state courts providing inconsistent legal stan-
dards regarding a pharmacist's duty to warn, the profession of
pharmacy has also failed to publicly agree and work towards the
acceptance and implementation of a consistent professional duty-
to-warn standard.4 This failure is especially troubling, given to-
day's practice environment where pharmacies and pharmacists
emphasize now, more than ever, their specialized drug knowledge,
advocating for additional responsibilities that extend beyond sim-
ply dispensing.5 Furthermore, pharmacists are now recognized as
patient educators who discuss drug therapies with patients and
other health care professionals, helping to assure the appropriate-
ness of prescribed medications.
6
To help resolve the legal uncertainties surrounding a pharma-
cist's duty to warn, a solution needs to be reached and adopted by
state courts and the profession. This article proposes a number of
changes that the authors consider important steps in reaching a
reasonable and realistic duty-to-warn standard that will hopefully
be used as guidance by state courts in future duty-to-warn civil
litigation and supported by the profession of pharmacy. Specifi-
cally, this article recommends that state courts should first recog-
nize that pharmacists do have a duty to warn. Then, in determin-
ing if a pharmacist breached that duty, a consistent standard of
care should be applied. Equally important, as pharmacists con-
tinue to expand their professional role, the profession of pharmacy
should also accept that with this expansion comes additional re-
sponsibilities, including a duty to warn. As such, necessary re-
2. Id. (describing how the state courts have various interpretations of a pharmacist's
duty to warn and providing examples of appellate court decisions that continue to differ on
if and when a pharmacist has a duty to warn).
3. See discussion infra Part II and III; David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty
Under OBRA-90 Standards, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 475, 509 (1997) (providing that courts of law
have disagreed about the abilities of pharmacists to assist patients; the relationships be-
tween pharmacists, patients, and physicians; and the policy implications of expanded
pharmacist responsibility which has led to a conflicting body of law that lacks cohesive
expression of standards on which patients and pharmacists can base their expectations for
each other).
4. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
5. See Fred Gebhart, Here Comes the Judge, Drug Topics, Vol. 149 No. 2, Jan. 24,
2005, at 30.
6. Brushwood, supra note 3, at 475.
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sources are required to move towards a consistent professional
standard.
Part I of this article reviews the background of the pharmacists'
duty to warn. Part II discusses various duty-to-warn cases that
highlight the legal inconsistencies that have continued to confuse
the pharmacy profession. Part III of this article proposes the rec-
ognition of a duty to warn, as well as a duty-to-warn standard that
can be met by pharmacists and promoted by the profession. Part
IV concludes that the time is now to advance towards a consistent
legal and professional standard regarding the pharmacists' duty to
warn.
I. THE PHARMACISTS' DUTY TO WARN
Traditionally, malpractice actions against pharmacists were
based solely on alleged inaccuracy in filling a prescription. 7 How-
ever, in recent decades, the focus of the profession of pharmacy
has shifted from that of a product-centered profession to a patient-
centered profession. The profession has adopted the pharmaceuti-
cal-care standard that seeks more pharmacist involvement in pa-
tient care in order to achieve definite outcomes and to improve a
patient's quality of life.
8
The passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
also known as OBRA 90, significantly expanded the services that
pharmacists were required to provide to patients. 9 OBRA 90 rec-
ognized that a public expectation of pharmacists went beyond
oversight of drug distribution to include the detection and resolu-
tion of problems with drug therapy, as well as minimum patient
counseling standards. 10 OBRA 90 was a federal law that required
states to adopt expanded standards of pharmacy practice if they
7. See David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty to Warn: Toward a Knowledge-
Based Model of Professional Responsibility, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 2-3, 22 (1991); R. Paul
Asbury, see also Pharmacist Liability: The Doors of Litigation are Opening, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 907-08, 927 (2000).
8. ROBERT A. BUERKI & LouIs D. VOTTERO, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF HISTORY OF
PHARMACY, ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN PHARMACY PRACTICE 21-22 (2d ed. 2002); see also
Jennifer L. Smith, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Propriety and Consequence of
Pharmacists' Expanding Liability and Duty to Warn, 2 HOUSE J. HEALTH L. & POLY 187,
201, 221-22 (2002) (defining pharmaceutical care as "the responsible provision of drug
therapy for the purpose of achieving definite outcomes that improve a patient's quality of
life" and explaining how the pharmaceutical care concept embraces the professionalism of
pharmacists by expanding their role beyond dispensing to include drug therapy, disease
management, patient counseling, and an overall outcome-oriented approach).
9. OBRA 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (2008).
10. RICHARD ABOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAW 228, 231 (Jack Bruggeman ed.,
Jones and Bartlett 4th ed. 2005).
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wanted to continue to receive Medicaid funds.11 Although states
were mandated by federal law to only expand pharmacy practice
standards for prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid patients,
most states implemented the standards to be applicable to pre-
scription drugs dispensed to all patients. 12 In particular, OBRA
90 requires pharmacists to screen prescriptions for potential drug
therapy problems; offer counseling to patients or their caregivers
in matters that, in the pharmacist's professional judgment, are
deemed significant to the proper use of the product and how to
manage potential problems that may arise; and maintain a writ-
ten record of individual patient histories that includes disease
states and known allergies. 13
In addition to OBRA 90, other actions have recognized that
pharmacist capabilities extend beyond the responsibility of drug
distribution and technical accuracy. One such example is how
many individual states have passed legislation allowing for the
further expansion of state-licensed pharmacists' roles to include
areas involving prescriptive authority and drug therapy manage-
ment.14 Another example is the Medicare Modernization Act,
through which the federal government recognized that pharma-
cists can be utilized to help obtain improved therapeutic outcomes
by providing Medication Therapy Management Services.15
Overall, as a result of multiple factors, the practice of pharmacy
has "evolved into much more than mechanical dispensing of medi-
cation."' 6 Likewise, as the pharmacists' role has continued to ex-
pand, the potential for imposition of professional and regulatory
liability has subsequently increased. 17 One particular area of mal-
practice litigation that has continued to evolve as the pharmacists'
11. Id. at 228-29.
12. Smith, supra note 8, at 209 (explaining that although OBRA 90 applied to Medicaid
beneficiaries, most states passed legislation extending the requirements to all patients);
Brushwood, supra note 3, at 485-86 (discussing in detail the OBRA 90 mandate and how
federal guidelines allowed for state variances and how pharmacists must comply with the
state version).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(i-ii).
14. Smith, supra note 8, at 200-02.
15. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173 117 Stat. 2066; see also Robert A. Gallagher, Pennsylvania Pharma-
cists Should No Longer Assume That They Have No Duty to Warn, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 59, 76-
77 (2006) (discussing how Medicare Part D has provisions for Medication Therapy Man-
agement Services which can be provided by health care professionals such as pharmacists).
16. Smith, supra note 8, at 204.
17. Asbury, supra note 7, at 907 ('Today, pharmacists take on a more active role in the
health care system, encompassing more responsibilities and consequently greater liabili-
ties").
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role in health care has expanded is with duty-to-warn cases. 18
Under this theory of liability, patients injured by prescription
drugs claim that the pharmacist had a duty to warn about the po-
tential adverse effects and other dangers associated with prescrip-
tion drugs. 19 With these types of cases, courts have been faced
with the question of when-and to what extent-a pharmacist
owes a duty to patients to warn of the dangers involved with a
particular drug therapy.
20
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the duty-to-
warn issue have held that there is no general duty for pharmacists
to warn patients about their prescribed drugs. 21 These cases re-
veal three theories relied upon by courts to support the view that
pharmacists do not have a general duty to warn. These theories
include: (1) interference with the physician-patient relationship,
(2) violation of the learned intermediary doctrine, and (3) that the
imposition of liability would contradict public policy. 22
In determining that pharmacists do not have a general duty to
warn, numerous courts have based their holdings on the fact that
to do otherwise would cause interference with the physician-
patient relationship. 23 Courts have reasoned that pharmacists
18. Asbury, supra note 7, at 928 (relying on the legislative mandate of OBRA 90 and an
expanded view of pharmacists' duty, a number of courts have found pharmacists liable for
failing to warn of the inherent risks of drugs); James Barney, Dancing Towards Disaster or
the Race to Rationality: The Demise of the Learned Intermediary Standard and the Phar-
macists' Duty to Warn, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 399, 410 (2004) ('The movement to establish a
pharmacist's duty to warn quite possibly began with the passage of the Omnibus Budge
Reconciliation Act of 1990."); Jaclyn Casey, Prescription for Compromise: Maintaining
Adequate Pharmacist Care Contraindicates Imposition of a General Duty to Warn, 17
WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 287, 311 (2005) ('The pharmacists' role in the health care industry
continues to evolve as does the imposition of liability on pharmacists for failure to warn
patients of the adverse effects of prescription drugs").
19. See NACDS Duty to Warn, supra note 1, at 1.
20. Smith, supra note 8, at 192.
21. See NACDS Duty to Warn, supra note 1, at 1; see also Smith, supra note 8, at 196-
200 (discussing cases in which the court found a pharmacist has no duty to warn); Barney,
supra note 18, at 406 (noting that though courts do not generally recognize claims against
pharmacists for failing to warn, courts have drawn a distinction between a pharmacist's
duty to warn of potentially negative side effects and the duty to warn of potentially adverse
drug interactions).
22. Smith, supra note 8, at 193-96 (discussing the three theories supporting the phar-
macists' no duty to warn rule); see also Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Civil Liability of Phar-
macists or Druggists for Failure to Warn of Potential Drug Interactions in Use of Prescrip-
tion Drug, 79 A.L.R. 5th 409 (2006) (providing that courts have cited several reasons for not
requiring pharmacists to warn about potential drug interactions, including: (1) pharma-
cists are not obliged to intervene in physicians' prescription decisions; (2) the duty to warn
about potential drug interactions should belong only to physicians; and (3) it would be
burdensome and against public policy to impose such a duty on pharmacists).
23. Casey, supra note 18, at 308 n.143 (providing case examples that have expressed
this concern).
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would need access to patient medical records in addition to learn-
ing the patient's medical condition before they could properly
warn a patient of the effects of a prescription drug, and that this
required access would inappropriately place the pharmacist in the
middle of the physician-patient relationship. 24 Other courts have
reasoned that to place a duty to warn on pharmacists would cause
pharmacists attempting to avoid liability to second-guess each
physician's prescription, disrupting the physician-patient relation-
ship.
25
In addition, other courts have held that pharmacists do not have
a duty to warn based on the learned-intermediary doctrine. 26 This
doctrine is derived from the theory that drug manufacturers have
a duty to inform physicians of the dangers of prescription drugs,
and that the physicians are in the best position to choose the ap-
propriate medication and advise patients of the inherent risks of
treatment.27 When courts extend the learned-intermediary doc-
trine to lawsuits against pharmacists, it insulates pharmacists
from liability and places upon prescribing physicians the respon-
sibility of warning patients of the potential risks of prescription
drugs.2
8
Numerous other courts have also determined that pharmacists
do not a have a duty to warn because it would contradict public
policy.29 Some courts have reasoned that to place a duty to warn
on pharmacists would burden the profession and expand the li-
ability of pharmacists. 30 Other courts have reasoned that numer-
ous or serious warnings provided by the pharmacist might
frighten and confuse patients, causing them to refrain from taking
the medication as prescribed, which could potentially endanger
their health.
31
24. See Edward Casmere, RX for Liability: Advocating the Elimination of the Pharma-
cist's No Duty to Warn Rule, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 425, 438 (2000).
25. Id. at 438-39.
26. Smith, supra note 8, at 194 n.45 (providing case examples that have extended the
learned intermediary doctrine to pharmacists).
27. Asbury, supra note 7, at 913; see, e.g., Casey, supra note 18, at 291-98 (providing
the policy reasons supporting the learned intermediary doctrine as a defense for pharma-
cists, including how it has traditionally shielded drug manufacturers from liability based
on the premise that warnings regarding the drug are provided in the product labeling to
the physician who in turn is in the best position to convey the warnings to the patient).
28. Asbury, supra note 7, at 912.
29. Smith, supra note 8 at 195 n.54 (providing case examples that have expressed this
concern).
30. Casmere, supra note 24 at, 440; Smith, supra note 8, at 219.
31. Smith, supra note 8, at 195.
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Although most courts have found that a pharmacist does not
have a general duty to warn, there has been a modern litigation
trend that continues to find ways to hold pharmacists liable for
their failure to warn patients. 32 A number of states have demon-
strated a willingness to recognize that pharmacists do have a duty
to warn, while other states have recognized a duty to warn under
limited circumstances. 33 Courts in the minority of states that
have determined that pharmacists have a duty to warn have ei-
ther relied on the duty-of-reasonable-care standard, the counsel-
ing laws under OBRA 90, or rejection of the learned-intermediary
doctrine.3 4 Furthermore, a number of jurisdictions that follow the
majority view, which states that pharmacists do not have a gen-
eral duty to warn, have found exceptions under limited circum-
stances, including when obvious inadequacies or clear errors exist
on the prescription; when the pharmacist voluntarily assumes the
duty; and when the pharmacist has special knowledge regarding a
patient.3
5
Currently, in trying to assess if and when a pharmacist could be
negligent for failing to warn a patient, one might notice that an
essential factor to consider is in which state(s) the pharmacist is
licensed to practice. With the practice of pharmacy being regu-
lated by each individual state, so is the determination of whether
a pharmacist has a duty to warn, and under what circumstances. 3
6
Unfortunately, what has evolved is a state-specific duty-to-warn
standard for pharmacists that varies greatly among the states
that have addressed the issue.
32. Casey, supra note 18, at 287, 311; Barney, supra note 18, at 401.
33. Smith, supra note 8, at 204 ("A number of courts are demonstrating a willingness to
recognize the contemporary role of the pharmacy profession when addressing the issue of a
pharmacist's duty to warn"); Barney, supra note 18, at 410 ("A number of courts have re-
cently held that pharmacists have a duty to warn in certain limited circumstances").
34. For a general discussion on this issue and specific case examples illustrating when
pharmacists have been held to have a duty to warn, see NACDS Duty to Warn, supra note 1
(providing a list of duty to warn cases by state); Casey, supra note 18, at 299-306 (discuss-
ing cases where courts have imposed a duty to warn and under what reasoning); Smith,
supra note 8, at 204-11 (discussing cases where courts have demonstrated a willingness to
recognize a pharmacists duty to warn); Barney, supra note 18, at 407-12 (discussing cases
that have found a duty to warn and under what theory).
35. See sources cited supra note 34. For a recent case that extended the learned inter-
mediary doctrine to pharmacists and provided a list of limited circumstances when phar-
macists would have a duty to warn, see Deed v. Walgreens, No. CV030823651S, 2004 WL
2943271 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).
36. Jesse C. Vivian, Procedural Aspects of the Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, U.S.






The issue of whether or not a pharmacist owes a duty to warn
has been the subject of constant struggle for state and federal
courts for many years. A ruling in which pharmacists were
deemed to have "no duty" to warn of adverse drug effects was
common among pharmacist malpractice appellate opinions of the
1980s.37 Beginning in the early 1990s, a trend emerged adopting a
different view, a view based on the description of duty provided in
Prosser's hornbook on torts.38 Specifically, Prosser states that the
existence of a duty depends on the character of the relationship
between the two parties rather than the nature of the actions
those parties undertake. 39 Imposing a no-duty-to-warn rule forces
the following issue to be addressed by the courts: "whether it is
proper for courts to hold that no duty exists without inquiring into
the relationship between the parties."40 As noted below with the
following cases, there is still much inconsistency as the courts
wrestle with how to interpret the pharmacists' duty to warn.
Many state court decisions have held that pharmacists do not
have a general duty to warn. For example, in Sanks v. Parke-
Davis, a patient received a prescription for Rezulin, a medication
used to treat diabetes that has since been withdrawn from the
market. 41 The prescription was taken to Eufaula Drugs, where it
was correctly filled. In her complaint, the plaintiff, Sanks, alleged
that the ingestion of Rezulin caused extensive liver damage, pain
and suffering, and mental anguish. She further asserted that
Eufaula Drugs did not warn her about Rezulin's potentially life-
threatening side effects. Under the controlling Alabama law,
however, a pharmacy or pharmacist who correctly fills a
prescription in strict accordance with the prescribing physician's
directions is protected by the learned-intermediary doctrine and is
not required to warn patients of potentially adverse side effects. 42
According to Sanks, a Eufaula Drugs pharmacist told her that
37. Brushwood, supra note 3, at 494.
38. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
39. Brushwood, supra note 3, at 495.
40. Casmere, supra note 24, at 448.
41. Sanks v. Parke-Davis, No. 00-S-1122-E, 2000 WL 33910097 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
42. See Lansdell v. American Home Prods., No. 99-S-2110-NE ,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22540 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (dismissing claims against pharmacist based on the learned
intermediary doctrine based upon implicit holding of Stafford v. Nipp, 502 So.2d 702 (Ala.
1987)); see also, Harrell v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab. Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-1194BHM,1999 WL
33548540 (S.D. Ala. 1999); Orr v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab. Co., No. CV-98-3000-DIET,1999 WL
33548162 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1999).
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Rezulin did not have any side effects. Sanks appeared to argue
that her interaction with the pharmacist demonstrated that
Eufaula Drugs breached a voluntarily assumed duty to warn her
about Rezulin's safety. The court, however, found this argument
unpersuasive because Sanks did not establish that the pharmacist
assumed a duty to warn. The crux of Sanks's argument was that,
despite knowledge to the contrary, the pharmacist failed to warn
her of the danger when he responded negatively to her questions
about Rezulin's safety. The court disagreed by holding that a
response to an inquiry was not the same as "volunteering" to act.
43
In Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,44 the patient's mother, Mor-
gan, testified that when she went to Wal-Mart to pick up her son's
medication, she "walked in and asked for the prescription for
Cameron. And the checkout person gave [her] the prescription and
charged [her] the money for it and [she] left and went home."
45
The parties stipulated that no Wal-Mart pharmacist
orally counseled Morgan about Desipramine's possible side effects.
They also agreed that Wal-Mart did not give Morgan the drug
manufacturer's package insert, which contained substantial
technical information about Desipramine, including warnings of
potentially adverse reactions. Pursuant to valid prescriptions
from Dr. Schroeder, the patient's physician, Morgan purchased
Desipramine three more times at Wal-Mart, the last time in
February 1993. Morgan testified that at no time did a Wal-Mart
pharmacist advise her of anything with respect to the drug. After
taking the medication for a lengthy period of time, the patient
developed and died from hypereosinophilic syndrome, a multi-
system disease affecting the liver, kidney, and central nervous
system.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart was
negligent in the sale of Desipramine "by failing to properly warn
intended users of the hazards and harms associated with the use
of the product."46  The court disagreed and held that, while
administrative rules demonstrate that pharmacists in Texas are
trusted professionals with varied and important responsibilities,
"they cannot be reasonably read to impose a legal duty to warn
43. See Sanks, supra note 41, at 15.
44. Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App. 2000).
45. Id. at 457.
46. Id. at 460.
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patients of the adverse effects of prescription drugs."47  It
continued:
The imposition of a generalized duty to warn would
unnecessarily interfere with the relationship between
physician and patient by compelling pharmacists seeking to
escape liability to question the propriety of every prescription
they fill. . . . Furthermore, a patient faced with an
overwhelming number of warnings from his or her pharmacist
may decide not to take a medication prescribed by a
physician, who has greater access to and knowledge of the
patient's complete medical history and current condition than
the pharmacist. Instead of imposing such an onerous and
counter-productive duty, the administrative rules reinforce
the notion that although pharmacists act as final auditors of
the technical accuracy of a prescription and its
appropriateness with respect to a patient's known condition
and medication record, they do not possess the extensive
knowledge of a physician with respect to a patient's complete
medical history and are thus not legally obligated to warn a
patient of adverse drug reactions.
48
In Podgurski v. U.S.,49 however, the court held that a
pharmacist has a limited duty to warn a customer about a
physician's prescription if, for instance, the prescribed medication
is obviously fatal or the dosage is unusual.50 Thus, a pharmacist
in Maryland does owe a duty to patients, but only under limited
circumstances. In this case, Podgurski had her prescription filled
at the NeighborCare pharmacy, where she previously had
prescriptions filled. As part of NeighborCare's standard
operations, new customers completed patient profiles that were
maintained on the pharmacy's computer system. In the allergy
section of Podgurski's patient profile, no warning appeared on the
47. Id. at 467.
48. Morgan, 30 S.W.3d at 467. See, e.g., Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 157.001 (West 2000)
(physician may delegate to pharmacist acting under physician's supervision the
performance of specific acts of drug therapy management); Tex. Admin. Code §
291.33(b)(2)(B)(i) (pharmacists may provide drug therapy management as delegated by a
physician).
49. Podgurski v. U.S, No. Civ.CCB-03-3180, 2005 WL 2338851, (D. Md. 2005).
50. See Moore v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 236 F.Supp.2d 509, 512-13 (D. Md. 2002) (citing
People's Service Drug Stores v. Sommerville, 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12, 13 (Md. 1932)). See
also Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 876 A.2d 115, 123, 162 Md. App. 673 (Md. App. 2005)
(citing cases but affirming liability on express warranty theory).
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pharmacist's computer screen when the Keflex prescription was
filled. Neither of Podgurski's adult children had spoken to anyone
at NeighborCare about their mother's allergy history nor had they
any knowledge of Podgurski telling NeighborCare about her
allergy history. After the patient ingested the medication, she
immediately experienced an anaphylactic reaction and
subsequently died. In finding for the defendant pharmacy, the
court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that
NeighborCare knew or should have known that Podgurski had an
allergy to penicillin; thus, no duty to warn was present.
5 1
The issue of foreseeability was raised in Happel v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.52 In Happel, the patient was prescribed Toradol.
Prior to receiving this prescription, Heidi, the patient, had been to
the Wal-Mart pharmacy about six times to have other
prescriptions filled. Each time she went, pharmacy workers asked
her if she had any drug allergies, and each time she told them she
was allergic to aspirin, acetaminophen, and ibuprofen. A Wal-
Mart pharmacy manager testified in his deposition that it was the
pharmacy's policy and procedure to ask customers about their
known allergies prior to dispensing medication. The purpose of
this practice was to alert the pharmacist to any drug interactions
or allergies. Both of the defendant's pharmacists testified that
Heidi's allergy information was in the pharmacy's computer
system and available to pharmacists when Heidi's Toradol
prescription was filled. If the Toradol information had been in the
pharmacy's computer, a "drug interaction" warning should have
flashed across the screen, halting the prescription process for
customers for whom Toradol was contraindicated. In that event,
the pharmacist should have called the physician to report the
contraindication. In Heidi's case, however, the pharmacist did not
remember calling Dr. Lorenc about the prescription nor did she
remember seeing any documentation indicating that she made
such a call.
Once Heidi learned that the prescription had been called in to
the Wal-Mart pharmacy, she telephoned her husband, Kent, at
work, and asked him to pick it up. Prior to that time, neither she
nor Kent had ever heard of Toradol, which is a non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drug (NSAID), similar to aspirin. Kent went to the
pharmacy to pick up the prescription, but before it was filled, a
51. Podgurski, No. Civ.CCB-03-3180, at *8.
52. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118 (Ill. 2002).
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pharmacy worker asked him about Heidi's drug allergies. Kent
informed the worker that Heidi was allergic to aspirin, ibuprofen,
and acetaminophen.
There were directions on the bottle that Heidi received from the
pharmacy, but there was no warning about contraindications.
Heidi took the first dose of Toradol and, within forty minutes, she
began to experience respiratory problems, including tightness in
her chest. She began a breathing treatment with a nebulizer and
called the pharmacy to ask if she could be having a reaction to
Toradol. Her call was disconnected. She called again and was
told that there should be no drug reaction problem. Heidi then
called a friend who was a pharmacist and was aware of her
allergies. He told her to begin a nebulizer treatment if she had
not already done so and to go to the emergency room if her
condition worsened. She went to the emergency room and was
found to be experiencing anaphylactic shock. Heidi testified in her
deposition that, as a result of taking Toradol, she subsequently
experienced more frequent asthma attacks, as well as seizures and
a worsening of her multiple sclerosis.
In finding for the plaintiff, the court found that the pharmacist
owed a narrow duty to warn the patient. Specifically, the court
stated:
A narrow duty to warn exists where, as in the instant case, a
pharmacy has patient-specific information about drug
allergies, and knows that the drug being prescribed is
contraindicated for the individual patient. In such instances,
a pharmacy has a duty to warn either the prescribing
physician or the patient of the potential danger.
5 3
A duty to warn was also recognized by the court in Horner v.
Spalitto.54 Peter Spalitto was the pharmacist on duty at Anthony
Spalitto's pharmacy and filled two prescriptions presented by
Horner. One prescription was for a quantity of fifty, 750
milligram (mg) doses of Placidyl, a strong hypnotic drug. The
prescribing physician instructed on the prescription that Homer
was to take one dose every eight hours. The other prescription
was for a quantity of fifty, 10 mg doses of Diazepam, a central
nervous system depressant, and it instructed Horner to take one
dose every eight hours. Before filling the prescriptions, Spalitto
53. Happel, 766 N.E.2d at 1129.
54. Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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consulted Facts and Comparisons, an authoritative pharmacy
manual, which indicated that the normal dose for Placidyl was one
500 mg dose or one 750 mg dose before bedtime. The manual also
warned that the drug's effects were enhanced when combined with
other central nervous system drugs, such as Diazepam.
Concerned about the physician's ordering such a high dose of
Placidyl, Peter Spalitto telephoned the prescribing doctor's office.
He later testified that someone in the physician's office told him
that the prescription was "okay" because Horner "needed to be
sedated throughout the day." Peter Spalitto filled the two
prescriptions. Several days later, Horner died due to toxic effects
of the prescription medicines. In finding for the plaintiff, the court
held that accurately filling a prescription may be a pharmacist's
only duty in particular cases, but in other cases, "a pharmacist's
education and expertise will require that he or she do more to help
protect their patrons from risks which pharmacists can reasonably
foresee." 55 The court determined that the factfinder must decide
what this duty requires of a pharmacist in a particular case. 56 The
court noted that a pharmacist, as is the case with every other
professional, must "exercise the care and prudence which a
reasonably careful and prudent pharmacist would exercise."57
The court in Dooley v. Everett58 also found that a duty to warn
could arise and went further in stating that pharmacists are
judged according to the standard of care required by their profes-
sion. 59 However, it has been as difficult for the pharmacy profes-
sion to determine this standard of care as it has the courts. The
National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP), for example,
has advocated for the elimination of the no-duty-to-warn rule. 6°
The NABP has gone further in asserting that "excusing pharma-
cists from a duty to warn causes pharmacists to ignore their edu-
cation, professional training, and the standards of practice estab-
lished by the pharmacy profession." 61 At least one state pharmacy
association agrees with this position as well.62
55. Horner, 1 S.W.3d at 522.
56. Id,
57. Id.
58. Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
59. Dooley, 805 S.W.2d at 385.
60. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Associations of Boards of Pharmacy at 33-34,
Happel v. Wal-Mart, 744 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. 2001) No. 90482, 2001 WL 34157036 [hereinafter
NABP Brief Amicus].
61. Id. at 16.
62. Supplemental Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Pharmacists Association
at 9-12, Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992) (No. 72908).
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From these few cases alone, it is apparent that state courts have
reached inconsistent interpretations regarding a pharmacist's
duty to warn. As it stands currently, pharmacists may be found in
some states to not have a duty to warn as a matter of law, while
other states could find that pharmacists do have a duty to warn or
at least under limited circumstances. Unfortunately, one of the
results of these legal inconsistencies among the states is that
there is no clear guidance to practicing pharmacists (or to those
that advise them), on what their legal expectations are regarding
their duty to warn. To help resolve this problem, a consistent,
reasonable solution regarding a pharmacist's duty to warn must
be reached and adopted by state courts and the profession.
III. PROPOSAL
To continue down the current evolutionary duty-to-warn path
will likely only bring additional years of inconsistent case law,
providing no clear expectations for pharmacists. It is therefore
time for the courts and the profession to make important changes
in recognizing that pharmacists do have a duty to warn, as well as
adopting a standard of care that can be provided by the reasonably
prudent pharmacist.
In providing a solution to the current duty to warn issue, it
should be noted that numerous experts and commentators have
been providing suggestions, recommendations, and potential solu-
tions for over a decade. 63 Specifically, numerous past recommen-
dations have included: elimination of the general no-duty-to-warn
rule; limiting the application of the learned-intermediary doctrine
to drug manufacturers and physicians; and the adoption of OBRA
90 as the minimal standard of pharmacy practice in duty-to-warn
litigation. 64 However, these suggestions and recommendations
have largely gone unnoticed by the courts and the profession. For
63. Brushwood, supra note 3, at 476, 497 (suggesting that pharmacists do have a duty
to warn based on the pharmacist-patient relationship and that the standard for pharmacy
practice described in OBRA 90 ought to be adopted as the minimal standard of care); Cas-
mere, supra note 24, at 445-49, 464 (advocating for the elimination of the no duty to warn
rule as well as limiting the application of the learned intermediary doctrine to drug manu-
facturers and physicians; and suggesting that the question of whether a duty exists should
be based on the foreseeability, relationship, and likelihood factors); Laura A. Carpenter &
Kenneth R. Baker, Pharmacists' Duty to Warn: Suggesting a Balance Between No Duty and
Undoable Duty, at 16 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duquesne Univer-
sity Law Review and author) (proposing that courts adopt the standards set forth by OBRA
90, state patient counseling laws and case law finding that pharmacists have a duty to
warn where a reasonable prudent pharmacist would do so).
64. See supra note 63.
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example, numerous courts that recently addressed the issue of
whether a pharmacist has a duty to warn continued to extend the
learned-intermediary doctrine to pharmacists. 65 Furthermore,
very few courts have utilized OBRA 90 language when addressing
the standard of care expected by pharmacists regarding their duty
to warn.
66
The authors of this article agree with many of these past pro-
posals, but assert that the profession must do more in addressing
the duty-to-warn issue. A reasonable, consistent duty-to-warn
standard would require the following changes: (1) recognition by
the courts that pharmacists do have a duty to warn; (2) recogni-
tion by the courts of a reasonable duty-to-warn standard of care
which incorporates OBRA 90; and (3) recognition and support by
the profession of pharmacy that pharmacists do have a duty to
warn, meeting a reasonable standard of care that is within phar-
macists' abilities and training.
A. Recognition by the Courts That Pharmacists Do Have a Duty
to Warn
Courts that continue to shield pharmacists from liability and
hold that there is no duty to warn as a matter of law should ac-
knowledge that the reasons supporting those holdings are out-
dated-or were invalid from the beginning. In other words, the
minority of courts and commentators that have provided contrary
information to support that pharmacists do have a duty to warn
should be reevaluated.
67
65. For recent case examples that have applied the learned intermediary doctrine to
pharmacists, see Deed v. Walgreens, supra note 35; Moore v. Memorial Hospital of Gulport,
825 So.2d 658 (Miss. 2002); Walls v. Alpharma, 887 So.2d 881 (Ala. 2004).
66. See Jesse C. Vivian & Joseph L. Fink III, OBRA '90 at Sweet Sixteen: A Retrospec-
tive Review, 33(3) U.S. Pharm., Vol. 33 No. 03, March 2008, at 65 (discussing how only six
published opinions have addressed the standard of care exercised by pharmacists using
OBRA 90 language). For case examples that have declined to consider OBRA 90 for the
duty to warn standard, see Deed v. Walgreens, supra note 35; Moore v. Memorial Hospital,
supra note 65; Saukas v. Walker Street Pharmacy, Inc., No. 260560, 2005 WL 1846289
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
67. Casmere, supra note 24, at 444-49 (rebutting support for the no duty to warn rule
and providing reasons why the pharmacist does have a duty to warn); Brushwood, supra
note 3, at 493-97 (providing a discussion and case examples of why pharmacists have a
duty); Smith, supra note 8, at 211-20 (arguing that the theories behind the no duty to warn
rule should be invalidated); Saukas v. Walker Street Pharmacy, supra note 66, at 3-4 (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting) (discussing how pharmacists have a legal duty to act in certain situa-
tions and that "by holding pharmacists accountable the quality of healthcare will improve,
and that any burden on pharmacists is outweighed by the public benefit").
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While the existence of a duty is a question of law, numerous
courts have based the decision of whether a pharmacist has a duty
to warn on reasons unrelated to the pharmacist-patient relation-
ship or the foreseeability of the adverse consequences. 68 There-
fore, courts should no longer rely on interference with the physi-
cian-patient relationship, the learned-intermediary doctrine, and
public-policy reasons as ways to shield pharmacists from civil li-
ability.69 Instead, courts should recognize that pharmacists are
patient educators who can provide counseling and valuable drug
information, as well as perform interventions that can positively
impact patient outcomes.70 Additionally, courts should continue to
move away from using or adopting the learned-intermediary doc-
trine regarding pharmacist liability and consider the various
courts and commentators who have suggested that the learned-
intermediary doctrine as a defense for pharmacists is a misappli-
cation of the rule.71 Overall, if courts were to start finding that
pharmacists do have a duty to warn, more legal actions against
the pharmacist would be allowed to proceed past summary judg-
ment to where the factfinder could determine if the pharmacist
acted reasonably and met the standard of care applicable to the
pharmacy profession.
72
B. Recognition by the Courts of a Reasonable Duty-to-Warn
Standard Which Incorporates OBRA 90
If more courts were to determine that pharmacists do have a
duty to warn, the next requirement would be for the factfinder to
68. Casmere, supra note 24, at 448-50, 460 (discussing how many cases in Illinois did
not determine if there was a duty based on analyzing the relationship, forseeability, or
likelihood and that courts should state that it is erroneous to conclude that a defendant
pharmacist has no duty to a plaintiff without first examining the relationship between the
pharmacist and the plaintiff); Brushwood, supra note 3, at 493-97 (discussing how when a
pharmacist-patient relationship exists, the pharmacist owes to the patient a duty to act
with reasonable care, which includes preventing foreseeable adverse consequences and
meeting administrative regulations promulgated under OBRA 90).
69. Casmere, supra note 24, at 444-47 (providing support that it is inappropriate to find
pharmacists do not have a duty to warn based on the physician-patient relationship, the
learned intermediary rule, and public policy reasons); Smith, supra note 8, at 211-20 (argu-
ing that the theories behind the no duty to warn rule should be invalidated).
70. Casmere, supra note 24, at 462-63; Brushwood, supra note 3, at 475-76, 505-06.
71. Casmere, supra note 24, at 445-46; Smith, supra note 8, at 215; NABP Amicus
Brief, supra note 60, at 33-41 (discussing case law examples that have rejected the applica-
tion of the learned intermediary doctrine and how the application of the doctrine should
solely be for manufacturers and physicians).
72. See NABP Brief Amicus, supra note 60, at 33-41 (providing examples of case law
that decided to allow the question of whether a pharmacist met their duty to be decided by
the trier of fact).
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determine if the pharmacist met the required standard of care
within the profession. However, as noted earlier, it has been diffi-
cult for the courts and the profession to determine what an appro-
priate standard of care is regarding a pharmacist's duty to warn.
Therefore, it is important for courts to agree on a standard of care
that is reasonable and realistic and that falls within the pharma-
cists' abilities and training.73 To assign a standard of care that
cannot be reached by pharmacists, such as counseling a patient
regarding every possible side effect of each prescription, would
only lead to unnecessary litigation and harm the profession.
74
Therefore, as past experts and commentators have suggested and
as the authors of this article assert, a reasonable duty-to-warn
standard should incorporate the already existing OBRA 90 prac-




In order to help assure that prescriptions are not likely to result
in adverse medical results, OBRA 90 requires pharmacists to meet
mandated prescription screening and patient education standards.
The particular section of OBRA 90 mandating that pharmacists
perform a prospective drug review, which requires a screening of
prescriptions prior to dispensing; meeting minimal patient coun-
seling standards; and keeping a record of patient information,
could be used by courts in helping to adopt a reasonable standard
of care regarding a pharmacist's duty to warn. 76
When counseling patients about prescription drugs, the phar-
macist acts as a patient educator and risk manager. 77 Counseling
helps to educate patients and allows them to manage the risks
73. Brushwood, supra note 3, at 502-03 (discussing how judicial expectations for phar-
macists should be realistic and that they should reflect the pharmacist's collegial role in
drug therapy); Carpenter, supra note 63, at 13-14 (suggesting that a "reasonable, consistent
legal [standard) for pharmacists should be in harmony with the real-life roles of pharma-
cists ... that legal duties must understand and take into [account] the abilities and train-
ing of the pharmacist;" and that to assign undoable duties will only hurt the profession).
74. Carpenter, supra note 63, at 14.
75. Brushwood, supra note 3, at 502-09 (discussing how OBRA 90 can be used as the
standard for a reasonable and prudent pharmacist); Carpenter, supra note 63, at 16 (pro-
posing that courts adopt the standards set forth by OBRA 90, state patient counseling laws
and case law finding that pharmacists have a duty to warn where a reasonable prudent
pharmacist would do so).
76. OBRA 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(i-ii) (2008).
77. Carpenter, supra note 63, at 14 (discussing how although "the pharmacist's knowl-




associated with taking the prescribed medication.78 Although the
physician assesses the risk when choosing the drug for the pa-
tient, it is the pharmacist that "counsel[s] the patient about how
to appropriately use the drug."79 Therefore, the minimum counsel-
ing requirements under OBRA 90 can be used by pharmacists to
help reach this goal in patient education and risk management
and by courts when determining a reasonable standard of care
regarding a pharmacist's duty to warn.
The minimum counseling requirements under OBRA 90 read, in
relevant part:
The pharmacist must offer to discuss with each individual
who presents a prescription, matters which in the exercise of
the pharmacist's professional judgment, the pharmacist
deems significant including the following:
(aa) The name and description of the medication.
(bb) The route, dosage form, dosage, route of administra-
tion, and duration of drug therapy.
(cc) Special directions and precautions for preparation,
administration and use by the patient.
(dd) Common severe side or adverse effects or interac-
tions and therapeutic contraindications that may be en-
countered, including their avoidance, and the action re-
quired if they occur.
(ee) Techniques for self-monitoring drug therapy.
(ff) Proper storage.
(gg) Prescription refill information.
(hh) Action to be taken in the event of a missed dose.8 0
Under this language, when pharmacists counsel patients about
appropriate drug use, the scope of the counseling discussion is de-
termined by the individual pharmacist, which allows pharmacists
the flexibility to include those matters that the pharmacist deems
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 16.
80. OBRA 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2008).
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significant.81 However, even with this flexibility, OBRA 90 lists
specific items for potential topics of discussion. In particular,
OBRA 90 provides for "common severe side or adverse effects" as a
discussion topic that could be used by courts in formulating a
duty-to-warn standard. In interpreting "common severe side ef-
fects," as past commentators have also suggested, the duty-to-
warn standard should only apply to side effects that are both
common and severe.8 2 It is not enough that a side effect is either
common or severe, as such a requirement could lead to pharma-
cists having to provide voluminous warnings.8 3 Furthermore, "the
determination of which side effects are common and severe is a
question of fact to be determined by the court evaluating expert
witness."
8 4
This approach effectively requires the pharmacist, during coun-
seling, to educate and warn patients about common and severe
side effects. It is not meant as a limitation to counseling but as a
compromise that seeks a reasonable balance between placing an
absolute duty on the pharmacist to counsel about every potential
side effect and holding that pharmacists have no duty to warn at
all. This particular OBRA 90 language can be used as guidance by
courts addressing cases that claim the pharmacist had a duty to
warn or counsel about adverse drug effects. This language, if
adopted into a duty-to-warn standard, would distinguish those
cases where the plaintiff experienced a common and severe side
effect from those cases where the plaintiff experienced a side effect
of very low probability or one that was not severe. This approach
is reasonable and realistic for the pharmacist, compared to various
other cases where the plaintiff has argued that the pharmacist
has a duty to warn of every potential side effect.
8 5
In addition to counseling patients about common and severe
side effects, a duty-to-warn standard "should also require the
pharmacist to act as a 'safety net' by evaluating known contraindi-
81. Carpenter, supra note 63, at 8.
82. Id. at 16 (discussing how the duty to counsel about appropriate drug use includes
warning patients about common and severe side effects); Brushwood, supra note 3, at 490
(discussing that "common severe side effects" should include those that are both common
and severe; however, this expert also suggested accepting common or severe).
83. Id. at 16 n.75 (providing for examples of why common and severe should be used
instead of common or severe, and that to require common or severe side effects could poten-
tially lead to frightening or discouraging the patient from taking necessary drugs).
84. Id. at 16-17.
85. For a recent case example highlighting how the plaintiff argued that the pharmacy
had a duty to warn about a rare side effect that had less than a one in one million chance of
occurring, see Chamblin v. K-Mart Corp., 612 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
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cations, allergies, drug-drug interactions and other prospective
drug utilization review factors."8 6 To better define this part of the
standard, past case law and the OBRA 90 language that requires
screening of prescriptions should be considered. Regarding past
case law, various appellate court decisions from numerous states
can be used as guidance in determining when it would be reason-
able for a pharmacist to have a duty to warn. These circum-
stances include, but are not limited to, making an intervention,
inquiring further about a prescription, considering special circum-
stances surrounding the patient known to the pharmacist, and
correcting obvious inadequacies on the prescription.8 7
Furthermore, in helping to determine when a pharmacist would
have a duty to warn by acting as a "safety net," the OBRA 90 lan-
guage that requires screening of prescriptions should also be con-
sidered. Regarding the screening of prescriptions prior to dispens-
ing, OBRA 90 reads in relevant part: "[t]he review shall include
screening for potential drug therapy problems due to therapeutic
duplication, drug-disease contraindications, drug-drug interac-
tions (including serious interactions with nonprescription or over-
the-counter drugs), incorrect drug dosage or duration of drug
treatment, drug-allergy interactions, and clinical abuse/misuse."88
Therefore, in addition to warning the patient during counseling of
severe and common side effects, if circumstances particular to the
patient exist that alert the pharmacist to a potential concern, the
pharmacist should investigate those circumstances and warn the
prescriber or patient when necessary.89
The above-mentioned OBRA 90 language, which provides pa-
tient education and prescription screening standards, could be
used by courts to adopt a defined standard of care regarding a
pharmacist's duty to warn. In addition, it is reasonable and real-
istic for the pharmacist. Not only would pharmacists be aware of
and understand their expectations, they would also be able to rea-
sonably obtain these expectations. Furthermore, for those states
that place additional responsibilities on pharmacists beyond the
minimal OBRA 90 standards, state courts could incorporate and
consider those as well into the standard of care. For example,
86. Carpenter, supra note 63, at 17.
87. Id. (discussing how pharmacists have a duty to act as a "safety net" and mentioning
various examples of cases that have found pharmacists have such a duty).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S(g)(2)(A)(i).
89. Carpenter, supra note 63, at 16.
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OBRA 90 only requires the offer to counsel the patient.90 Numer-
ous states have extended this minimal standard and require the
pharmacist to counsel patients on each new prescription. 91 These
variations from the OBRA 90 minimal standards could then be
considered by that individual state in determining whether the
pharmacist met that state's particular duty-to-warn standard.
However, this test would not place unreasonable expectations on
pharmacists practicing in states with expanded requirements be-
yond OBRA 90. Pharmacists would have knowledge of the height-
ened requirements and could still seek advice regarding any spe-
cial obligations.
Unfortunately, even with OBRA 90 having been in place for al-
most fifteen years, state courts continue to decline to incorporate
OBRA 90 laws and regulations adopted by each state into a duty-
to-warn standard for pharmacists. 92 Ideally, courts will start
turning to their state laws and regulations that stem from OBRA
90 for guidance regarding a pharmacist's duty to warn.
C. Recognition and Support by the Profession of Pharmacy That
Pharmacists Do Have a Duty to Warn, Meeting a Reasonable
Standard of Care That Is Within Pharmacists'Abilities and
Training
With years of education and specialized training, pharmacists
are recognized as the drug experts among members of the health-
care team. Although the profession acknowledges that pharma-
cists play an important role in today's health care beyond dispens-
ing, the profession has still yet to agree that pharmacists do have
a duty to warn, as well as advocate and provide resources for
pharmacists to meet a reasonable standard of care.
Various pharmacy organizations, companies, and associations
have differed on their view of whether a pharmacist has a duty to
warn.93 For example, in an amicus brief to the Illinois Supreme
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
91. Carpenter, supra note 63, at 9 (quoting ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-23-402(b)(2007)
which goes above "the 'offer to counsel' and requires counseling when a prescription medi-
cation has not been previously dispensed to the patient in the same strength or dosage form
or with the same directions").
92. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. For a discussion on various phar-
macy professional organizations which have advocated for duties of a pharmacist consistent
with the duties of the profession, see Casmere, supra note 24, at 455-56. For examples of
recent case law that provide pharmacy companies arguing pharmacists do not have a duty
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Court on behalf of the plaintiff in Happel, the NABP commented
that "the recognition of a duty in this case is commensurate with
the status of pharmacy as a profession and with the pharmacist's
professional responsibilities." 94 On the other hand, in an amicus
brief on behalf of the defendant pharmacy in Happel, the National
Associations of Chain Drug Stores ("NACDS") supported the de-
fendant's position that a pharmacist does not have the responsibil-
ity to warn a patient of potential adverse characteristics of a drug.
In response to the NABP amicus brief, NACDS stated:
NABP has a vision of pharmaceutical care, in which pharma-
cists have the time and opportunity to have privileged discus-
sions with consumers about all aspects of their drugs.
NACDS supports that vision of the practice of pharmacy.
However, that vision of pharmacy practice does not require
the imposition of new tort liability against pharmacists. 95
Furthermore, pharmacy companies continue to take the position
during litigation that pharmacists do not have a duty to warn.
For example, in one recent case, the defendant pharmacy con-
tended that "the pharmacist's duty is to fill prescriptions, not
write them, or warn patients about potential side effects," and to
"accurately fill a prescription in accordance with a physician's in-
structions, not to question the propriety of the judgment made by
the prescribing physician."96 However, while the defendant phar-
macy in this case acknowledged that "the role of the pharmacist
has changed from a simple dispenser of medicine to a trusted pro-
fessional playing an essential part in medical treatment," it also
asserted that "courts have held that the learned intermediary doc-
trine applies to pharmacists because while they are not mere
automotons, they do not have a doctor-patient relationship with
the consumer and because they do not prescribe the medication
they sell." 97
to warn, see Deed v. Walgreens, supra note 35; see also Brienze v. Casserly, No. 01-1655-C,
2003 WL 23018810 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003).
94. See NABP Brief Amicus, supra note 60, at 15; John F. Atkinson, A Positive Step,
NABP Newsletter, Vol. 30 No. 1, Jan. 2001 at 4-6 (discussing how in Happel the NABP
supports the pharmacist having a duty to warn where the NACDS supports the position
that pharmacist do not have a responsibility to warn a patient of potential adverse charac-
teristics of drugs).
95. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Associations of Chain Drug Stores at 35; Hap-
pel v. Wal-Mart, 744 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. 2001) (No. 90482), available at 2001 WL 34157033.
96. See Deed v. Walgreens, supra note 35, at 3.
97. Id.
Vol. 47
A Pharmacist's Duty to Warn
Therefore, given that various stakeholders within the pharmacy
profession are unable to agree on whether a pharmacist has a duty
to warn, the profession of pharmacy should accept as a profes-
sional standard that pharmacists do have a duty to warn and meet
a reasonable standard of care. Although there may be concerns
about additional pharmacist litigation, the opposite may occur:
there may be a decrease in litigation through improved patient
outcomes and having less patients experience adverse drug ef-
fects. 98 In addition, by recognizing that pharmacists do have a
duty and by working towards meeting an agreed-upon standard of
care, pharmacists will continue towards the professional recogni-
tion they deserve. 99
In order to meet this duty, the profession must advocate for im-
proving the current working conditions for pharmacists. To ade-
quately warn patients of common and severe side effects and in-
tervene with potential drug therapy concerns, pharmacists must
have adequate time to counsel patients and screen prescriptions.
It is likely that many pharmacists across the country are already
meeting or exceeding the recommended suggested duty-to-warn
standard of care; however, recent national news reports suggested
that there may not be adequate resources available for pharma-
cists to perform these important functions most or all of the
time.100 These news reports point to the pharmacists' workload,
including high prescription volume and limited time for the pre-
scription filling process, as well as staffing issues that pharma-
cists may encounter that could hinder their ability to meet the
suggested duty-to-warn standard. 0 1
In addition to highlighting medication errors that pharmacists
make, recent news reports have also addressed how numerous
pharmacy retail chains are potentially encouraging pharmacists to
fill a high volume of prescriptions at a fast pace. 10 2 One report
described the concern as "overworked pharmacists are pushed to
fill prescriptions at a fast food pace." 0 3 In this type of work envi-
ronment, pharmacists may not have adequate time to counsel pa-
98. Casmere, supra note 24, at 461-63.
99. Id. at 462.
100. See Kevin McCoy & Erik Brady, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 12, 2008, at 1A,
8A; Kevin McCoy, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 13, 2008, at 1B-2B; Kevin McCoy &
Erik Brady, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 14, 2008, at 3B; 20/20: A RX for Disaster
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2007).
101. See sources cited supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. See 20/20: A RX for Disaster, supra note 100.
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tients regarding their prescription medications or to identify po-
tential drug therapy problems. 10 4 Furthermore, as prescription
volume has increased over 12 percent from 2002, pharmacy man-
power has not accordingly increased. 10 5 This increasing workload
and demand on pharmacists erodes the quality of care provided,
especially with regard to the pharmacist's ability to counsel pa-
tients. 10 6 To illustrate this point, the media mentioned one par-
ticular lawsuit against a chain pharmacy where the jury awarded
a family six million dollars. This verdict came after evidence was
introduced that the pharmacist, after dispensing two pain medica-
tions at different times, neither warned the patient about the po-
tential drug interaction nor verified with the physician that the
two prescriptions were to be taken together.
10 7
Furthermore, these recent news stories noted that pharmacists
often do not provide medication counseling to patients when pre-
scriptions are picked up by patients. It was explained how, typi-
cally, pharmacy technicians ask patients if they have any ques-
tions for pharmacists, and if the patient declines, pharmacists of-
ten do not meet the patients. 08 Moreover, when pharmacy techni-
cians offer patients to be counseled, it is unlikely that the offer
will be accepted. 10 9 The suggestion that most patients decline the
offer to ask their pharmacist questions is also supported by one
recent duty-to-warn case, which commented "[l]ike most pharmacy
customers, [the plaintiff] declined an offer to speak to the pharma-
cist at the time."110
In addition to many patients declining their offer to receive
counseling, concerns have also been raised that other patients ei-
ther do not receive an offer of counseling or do not understand
that they are being given an offer of counseling."' One recent
news report noted how states require pharmacies to offer face-to-
face counseling to customers when they pick up their prescrip-
tions, but that various state records have shown that numerous
pharmacy chains were cited for failing to offer or provide counsel-
104. See sources cited supra note 100.
105. See Kevin McCoy & Erik Brady, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 12, 2008, at 1A,
8A.
106. Casey, supra note 18, at 308,
107. See Kevin McCoy & Erik Brady, RXfor Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 12, 2008, at 8A.
108. See Kevin McCoy, RXfor Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 13, 2008, at 2B.
109. See Kevin McCoy and Erik Brady, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 14, 2008, at
3B.
110. See Brienze, supra note 93, at 1.
111. See 20/20: A RX for Disaster, supra note 100.
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ing.112 Another journalist report noted that during an investiga-
tion, only 27% of patients receiving new prescriptions were offered
counseling. 113 In addition to patients potentially not receiving an
offer to be counseled, there were concerns that patients are being
misled into signing away their right to be counseled without ever
realizing it."14
Therefore, if pharmacists had the resources to provide patient
counseling and to act on potential drug therapy concerns, it would
allow the profession to work towards meeting the duty-to-warn
standard proposed in this article. Furthermore, if adequate re-
sources were available, and if a patient declined the offer to coun-
sel, a pharmacist could still take the initiative and alert the pa-
tient to the available information.115 The concept of universal
counseling is possible only if pharmacy operators give pharmacists
the staffing and the time to handle discussions with patients in an
era of increasing prescription volume."
6
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the pharmacists' duty to warn has provided le-
gal inconsistencies among the state courts that have addressed
the issue. A variety of interpretations have been established re-
garding if and when pharmacists owe patients a duty beyond ac-
curately filling prescriptions. As such, no clear guidance exists for
the profession as to exactly what duty-to-warn responsibilities
pharmacists must fulfill.
For years, the pharmacy profession has promoted and advocated
its extended role in health care beyond that of just technical accu-
racy in the prescription order process. In accepting this responsi-
bility, pharmacists should embrace a standard that utilizes their
knowledge and skills in assisting patients and intervening on
their behalf while increasing positive therapeutic outcomes.
Given the status of the pharmacists' duty to warn, time is of the
essence for state courts and the pharmacy profession to work to-
wards a solution that includes expanding the role of pharmacy
112. See Kevin McCoy and Erik Brady, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 12, 2008, at
8A.
113. See 20/20: A RX for Disaster, supra note 100.
114. Id.
115. See Kevin McCoy and Erik Brady, RX for Errors, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 14, 2008, at
3B (quoting Carmen Catizone, Executive Director of NABP, that pharmacists should seize
the initiative and counsel patients on all new prescriptions).
116. Id.
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and its capabilities. To reach a solution, important changes are
needed. Assuming pharmacists have a duty to warn by meeting a
reasonable standard of care, which incorporates the patient coun-
seling and prescription screening standards found in OBRA 90,
the profession itself must advocate and provide adequate re-
sources for pharmacists to meet this standard. Hopefully, state
courts and the profession of pharmacy will recognize the impor-
tance of accepting and working towards a consistent legal and pro-
fessional standard regarding the pharmacists' duty to warn.
